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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PLimtiH/Apixlhuil, 
vs. 
SCOTT DAVID FERRY, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20040537-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Vi' VTMMI'N I1 < IK JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this mallei pur*'..; : t-c provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESEN i ('! J \ 'V: \ 1 \ \ ! I \ l{ I)S (»f k S \ i 1'\\ 
1. Whether the evidence was insufficient to establish that Ferry had the power and 
intent to exercise control over the paraphernalia and drug in question? "The standard of 
review when the sufficiency of the evidence in a jury trial is challenged is well 
established. [Tjhe evidence and the reasonable inferences which might be drawn 
therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. A jury 
conviction is reversed for insufficient evidence only when, so viewed, is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted." 
State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah App. 1991). Because this issue was not 
preserved below, it is reviewed for plain error. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at f^ 11, 10 
P.3d 346. Alternatively, this issue should be reviewed to determine whether defense 
counsel's failure to move for a directed verdict constituted ineffective assistance of 
counsel? Where the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time 
on direct appeal, the issue is resolved as a matter of law. State v. Cosey, 873 P.2d 1177, 
1179 (Utah App.), cert denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (1994). 
2. Whether Ferry was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel at trial where trial counsel failed to timely file a motion to suppress statements 
made to a police officer? In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, it is the 
defendant's burden to show "first, that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in 
some demonstrable manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonable professional judgment, and second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the 
defendant." State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, Tf25, 1 P.3d 546 (citations omitted). Where the 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on direct appeal, the 
issue is resolved as a matter of law. Cosey, 873 P.2d at 1179. 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All controlling statutory provisions and rules are set forth in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Scott David Ferry appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the 
Third District Court after being found guilty of possession of a controlled substance, a 
third degree felony, and possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class B misdemeanor. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Scott David Ferry was charged by information filed in the Third Judicial District 
Court on or about January 3, 2003, with unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i); and unlawful 
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Annotated §58-37a-(5)(l) (R. 2-3). 
A preliminary hearing was held on May 8, 2003, and Ferry was bound over for 
trial (R. 18). 
On July 25, 2003, Ferry filed a Motion to Suppress Statements Made to the Police, 
asserting that his statements were obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment (R. 77-
79). Trial counsel requested the trial court to consider the motion to suppress despite its 
untimeliness on the morning of trial, July 30, 2003, but the trial court denied the motion 
for late filing pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (R. 197: 3-
7). 
Jury trial was held on July 30, 2003 (R. 197). The jury found Ferry guilty of 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, and unlawful 
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor (R. 134-35). 
Sentencing was held on June 14, 2004 (R. 175). Based on Ferry's conviction of 
unlawful possession of a controlled substance, he was sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison (R. 175). Prison time is to run 
consecutive with Federal prison time (R. 176). And based on Ferry's conviction of use or 
possession of drug paraphernalia, he was sentenced to a term of 180 days in jail, total 
time suspended (R. 176). Ferry was also placed on probation for 36 months (R. 176). 
On June 21, 2004, Ferry timely filed a Notice of Appeal from the judgment, 
sentence, and commitment in this case in the Third District Court and this action 
commenced (R. 177). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Testimony of Deputy Kent Cameron 
Kent Cameron is employed with the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office, and on 
November 15, 2002, in the early morning, he was patrolling near 40th West and 52nd 
South (R. 197: 13-14). Cameron saw a Ford Tempo driving with no headlights on and 
proceeded to stop the vehicle (R. 197: 14-15). 
Once he stopped the vehicle, Cameron observed wCa lot of subtle movement, 
particularly the driver, I - the driver almost looked like he was bending forward, reaching 
down to the floor, and I seen his arms and shoulders kinda moving" (R. 197: 15). 
Cameron could see that four people were in the vehicle, but the driver was the one doing 
the moving (R. 197: 15, 16). Cameron also testified that it appeared that the driver bent 
all the way down and placed something on the floor (R. 197: 29). 
The driver was Corey Park (R. 197: 17, 29). Ferry was sitting directly behind 
Corey Park (R. 197: 18). Cameron asked the driver and passengers to step out of the 
vehicle (R. 197: 18). Ferry went outside to the back of the vehicle with another officer 
and then Cameron saw a syringe lying on the floor behind the driver's seat (R. 197: 19). 
After seeing the syringe, Cameron went over to Ferry and asked him if he knew the 
syringe was there (R. 179: 20). Cameron testified that Ferry told him "he knew the 
syringe was there on the floor, but he doesn't know who it belongs to" (R. 179: 20). 
Cameron did not ask Ferry how long he had known the syringe was in the car (R. 197: 
35). Nor did Cameron ask who had been in the car earlier that day or when was the last 
time the car had been cleaned (R. 197: 35). 
Cameron proceeded to search the vehicle and found a wooden box containing 
marijuana underneath the driver's seat (R. 197: 22-23). Park admitted to Cameron that 
the box and marijuana were his (R. 197: 24). 
Cameron testified that the syringe was not testified for fingerprints merely because 
"it's not practice to take fingerprints off of items like that" (R. 197: 24). The syringe 
tested positive for methamphetamine (R. 197: 26). Cameron did not check Ferry for any 
needle marks on his body (R. 197: 27). Moreover, Cameron did not submit anyone to 
drug tests in order to see if anyone would test positive for methamphetamine (R. 179: 
33). Cameron knew that one passenger, Sarah Bizwell, had a long history of drug abuse, 
but she was not asked to take a drug test (R. 197: 34). Cameron also did not have the 
syringe tested for blood or DNA evidence (R. 197: 36). 
Cameron arrested Ferry and transported him to the county jail (R. 197: 27). 
Cameron had a conversation with Ferry enroute to the jail, and without advising Ferry of 
his Miranda rights, he learned that Ferry had "been addicted to drugs and had a problem 
with drugs for the past few years. His drug of choice was meth and he - the last time he 
had a hit or a dose of meth was ten hours ago, prior to me making contact with him" (R. 
197: 27, 39). 
Cameron also arrested Park and charged him with possession of marijuana and 
methamphetamine (R. 197: 30). However, Park's father is Detective Todd Park with the 
Salt Lake City Police Department and Park's charges, for some unexplained reason, were 
dismissed (R. 197:30,32). 
Testimony of Scott David Ferry 
Scott David Ferry testified that on the November 15, 2003, he was with his friends 
driving to another friend's house when they were pulled over for driving without 
headlights on (R. 197: 42-44). Ferry testified that when they stopped, the driver crouched 
down "trying to stash stuff (R. 197: 45). The officer asked everyone for the l.D.'s, then 
had the driver step out of the car first, then the other passengers (R. 197: 45-46). 
Ferry testified that he told the officer he knew that the syringe was there and that it 
was not his (R. 197: 46). Ferry was arrested and on the way to jail, they "were talking 
about drug use and I told him that I - that I did use drugs and that my drug of choice was 
meth, but that wasn't - that wasn't my needle in the car" (R. 197: 47). The officer never 
gave Ferry a Miranda warning (R. 197: 47). Ferry also testified that he never told the 
officer that he had used methamphetamine 10 hours earlier (R. 197: 47). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Ferry asserts that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he knowingly and 
intentionally possessed a controlled substance or drug paraphernalia. The only evidence 
linking Ferry to the charges was that he was sitting near where the syringe was found, his 
knowing that it was there, and his alleged statement taken in violation of Miranda that he 
used drugs and had used methamphetamine ten hours prior to his arrest. This evidence is 
insufficient to prove a nexus between Ferry and syringe to support a finding that he is 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In fact, the evidence establishes that it is more 
reasonable to believe that the syringe belonged to another person other than Ferry. 
In the alternative, Ferry asserts his trial counsel' s performance constituted 
ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to timely file a motion to suppress statements 
obtained in violation of his rights per Miranda. Ferry was interrogated in a police car 
while en route to the county jail without being read his rights. Trial counsel knew about 
this violation, but filed an untimely motion that was not considered by the trial court. But 
for this deficient performance, evidence of Ferry's prior drug use would not have been 
considered. Without such evidence, Ferry would not have been convicted. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH BEYOND 
A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT FERRY POSSESSED A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE OR DRUG PARAPHERNALIA 
Ferry asserts that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he knowingly and 
intentionally possessed a controlled substance or drug paraphernalia and that it was plain 
error for the trial court to submit the case to the jury. 
An unpreserved claim can be addressed on appeal if the "defendant can 
demonstrate that... 'plain error' occurred." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f^ 11, 10 P.3d 
346 (quoting Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996); State v. Lopez, 886 
P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994)). To establish plain error in the context of an insufficiency 
claim, "a defendant must demonstrate that the evidence was insufficient to support a 
conviction of the crime charged...." Holgate, 2000 UT 71 at ^ 17. "To demonstrate that 
the evidence is insufficient to support a jury verdict, the one challenging the verdict must 
marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is 
insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Hopkins, 
1999 UT 98, % 14, 989 P.2d 1065 (quoting Crookston v. Fire Ins, Exck, 817 P.2d 789, 
799 (Utah 1991)). "[W]e will conclude that the evidence was insufficient when, after 
viewing the evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict the evidence i s sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such 
that reasonable minds must have entertained reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime for which he or she was convicted.'" Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at % 18 
(quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1212 (Utah 1993)). Then the defendant must 
show "that the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the trial court erred in 
submitting the case to the jury." Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at ^ 17. 
A, The evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. 
The State relied solely on circumstantial evidence in an attempt to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Ferry exercised dominion or control over the drugs in question. 
The only evidence connecting Ferry to the drugs found in the car was the fact that he was 
sitting nearby where the drugs were found and his statement made while riding in the 
police car that he had used methamphetamine in the past and that he knew the syringe 
was in the car, but the drugs were not his. Ferry asserts that this circumstantial evidence 
is insufficient to establish the test for constructive possession. 
"[T]o show constructive possession, the State must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the drugs were subject to the defendant's dominion and control and the 
defendant had the intent to exercise that control." State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, f 16, 985 
P.2d 911. "However, persons who might know of the whereabouts of illicit drugs and 
who might even have access to them, but who have no intent to obtain and use the drugs 
can not be convicted of possession of a controlled substance. Knowledge and ability to 
possess do not equal possession where there is no evidence of intent to make use of that 
knowledge and ability." State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985). Moreover, a 
defendant's *cmere occupancy of a portion of the premises where the drug[s were] found 
cannot, without more, support a finding" that defendant knowingly and intentionally 
possessed a controlled substance. State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 132 (Utah 1987). 
Furthermore, "jwjhere the only evidence presented against the defendant is 
circumstantial, the evidence supporting a conviction must preclude every reasonable 
hypothesis of innocence. This is because the existence of a reasonable hypothesis of 
innocence necessarily raises a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt." State v. Hill, 
727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986) (plurality opinion) (citing State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216, 
219 (Utah 1976)). 
In State v. Layman, 953 P.2d 782 (Utah App. 1998), affirmed 1999 UT 79, 985 
P.2d 911, Layman and his father, Hobart Layman (Hobart), went to the home of Gina 
Ziegenhirt (Gina). Id. at 784. Hobart asked Gina if she wanted to go with them to Vernal 
and make some money on the sale of methamphetamine. Id. Gina had never met 
Layman, and Layman was upset with Hobart for inviting Gina. Id. The three arrived in 
Vernal early in the morning and went directly to a motel. Id. While there, Gina saw 
Hobart in the bathroom with drugs and heard him complain that his scales were not 
working correctly. After twenty minutes, they left the hotel and Layman dropped Hobart 
off, at which time Hobart handed Gina a pouch containing drugs and paraphernalia. Id. 
Gina assumed the drugs Hobart gave her were hers and Hobart's. Id. 
A short time later, the police stopped Layman for a faulty taillight. Layman, 953 
P.2d at 784. Before Layman stopped, he jerked his car suddenly to the right and then to 
the left before stopping his car in a position perpendicular to the police car. Id. Layman 
walked Cwbriskly" toward the officer and was told his light was not working. Id. Layman 
then opened the car trunk and tried to fix the taillight. Id. Layman's eyes wer red. 
bloodshot, watery, and glassy, and he appeared very anxious and fidgety, unable to 
remain in one location for any length of time. Id. 
In response to questioning from the officer, Layman told him that he had no drugs 
or open containers in his car and he consented to a search of the vehicle. A quick search 
of Layman revealed no weapons, but the officer did see a pouch stuffed in Gina's 
waistband. Id. The officer tried to obtain the pouch from Gina, and while doing so, Gina 
looked nervously toward Layman and Layman shook his head in a negative fashion back 
and forth. Id. The officer finally obtained the pouch and discovered it contained 
numerous syringes, a spoon, a large baggy of methamphetamine, and a set of plastic 
scales. Id. Two of the syringes had been used and the quantity of methamphetamine was 
more than one would have for one's personal use. Id. However, at no time did the 
officer see the pouch or its contents in Layman's physical custody and at no time during 
the course of the stop did he observe any movements indicating Layman had handed 
anything to Gina. Id. at 785. 
Field sobriety tests were conducted on Layman and the officers concluded that he 
was under the influence and incapable of driving. Layman was also given a blood test 
which showed the presence of methamphetamine in his blood stream. Layman, 953 P.2d 
at 785. 
A bench trial was held and Layman was convicted for driving under the influence 
of drugs or alcohol, possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, and 
possession of paraphernalia. Id. at 784. On appeal, Layman challenged, among other 
things, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the finding of constructive possession. 
Id. 
This Court concluded that the evidence adequately "supports a conclusion that 
Layman was under the influence of drugs, it does not [however,] support, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, a finding that Layman had the knowledge, ability, and intent to 
exercise dominion and control over the contraband found on Gina's person." Layman, 
953 P.2d at 789. This Court further found that the State failed to produce any evidence, 
"beyond a reasonable doubt... that Layman knew about Hobart's drug transactions or the 
contents of Gina's pouch.... There is not a sufficient quality or quantity of evidence ... 
indicating or from which a fact finder could infer that Layman was present at any time 
during which Hobart and Gina discussed their drug transaction, that he was aware he was 
driving his father to Vernal to complete that transaction, that he was present in the motel 
room or within hearing range while Hobart weighed and discussed the drugs with Gina, 
or that he was a ware of the contents of the pouch that Hobart had given Gina." Id. at 
789-790. 
This Court found that this circumstantial evidence provides other reasonable 
hypotheses of Lawman's innocence. Layman, 953 P.2d at 790. This Court then stated 
that the circumstantial evidence did unot exclude the possibility" that Layman was 
unaware about the drugs in Gina's pouch. Id. This Court noted that Layman did not 
attempt to flee after being stopped and that no drugs were found in his car or on his 
person, nor did Layman make any furtive "movements indicating [he] had handed 
anything to Gina." Id. 
Moreover, this Court disputed the State's assertion that Layman's "drug use 
supports a conclusion that [he] must have had access to and control over the drugs...." 
Layman, 953 P.2d at 791. This Court noted that there was no evidence suggesting that 
Hobart or Gina shared in Layman's drug use or that either received enjoyment from 
Layman's use. Id. Thus, there was no basis to support a finding of "mutual use and 
enjoyment" which otherwise might support a finding of joint participation. Id. 
Finally, this Court dispatched the State's assertion that Layman's shaking his head 
when the officer searched Gina indicated knowledge and some type of control over the 
drugs. Layman, 953 P.2d at 791. Even if Layman was aware of the drugs in the pouch, it 
was "equally plausible" that Layman was only giving Gina advice not to incriminate 
herself or he was merely expressing frustration that he was with a person caught with 
drugs. Id. 
In conclusion, this Court held that Layman's convictions were based on 
"conjectures and probabilities" and "inference upon inference." Layman, 953 P.2d at 
792, 791. Accordingly, this Court reversed Layman's conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute. Id. at 792. The Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, holding that there were insufficient "facts which 
show that the accused intended to use the drugs or paraphernalia as his own." Layman; 
1999 UT 79 at \ 13. 
In State v. Salas, 820 P.2d 1386 (Utah App. 1991), police received a tip from an 
infonnant that the defendant would be in possession of cocaine during his lunch hour. Id. 
at 1386. The police ran a check through the State computer to determine whether the 
defendant had a valid driver's license. Id. No valid driver's license was found, even 
though the defendant had one. Id. At noon, the officers observed the defendant leave his 
place of employment with two other men and enter a vehicle matching the description 
given by the informant. Id. at 1387. The police stopped the defendant for driving without 
a license and told the defendant that they received a tip that the defendant would be in 
possession of cocaine. Id. The defendant told the officers that he did not "have anything 
to worry about," and consented to a search of his vehicle. Id. During a search of the 
vehicle, the officers discovered a package containing cocaine in the crack of the backseat 
on the driver's side of the vehicle. Id. When the officers discovered the cocaine, the 
defendant testified "they put it there." Id. 
This Court held that "[a] sufficient nexus is not established by mere ownership 
and/or occupancy of the premises upon which the drugs were found ... especially when 
occupancy is not exclusive." Salas, 820 P.2d at 1389. (citation omitted). Additionally, 
this Court stated: 
In order to find that the accused was in possession of drugs found in an automobile 
he was not the sole occupant of, and did not have sole access to, there must be 
other evidence to buttress such an inference. The law has recognized several 
particular evidentiary factors linking or tending to link an accused with drugs. 
These include incriminating statements, suspicious or incriminating behavior, sale 
of drugs, use of drugs, proximity of defendant to location of drugs, drugs in plain 
view, and drugs on defendant's person. * 
Id. 
This Court, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, 
held that the factual evidence was inconclusive as to whether the defendant knew of or 
possessed the cocaine. Salas, 820 P.2d at 1389. The Court observed that the defendant's 
wife was the co-owner of the vehicle and there were two passengers in the vehicle at the 
time of arrest. Id. Further, the passengers had better access to the spot where the cocaine 
was found. Id. The Court also stated that the "defendant denied the presence of cocaine 
before the search, did not try to escape during the search ... and did not have drugs or 
paraphernalia on his person at the time of arrest." Id. Moreover, one of the backseat 
passengers sitting behind the defendant "moved around just before the stop." Id. at 1388. 
The Court concluded "[t]his furtive movement, coupled with the fact that the cocaine was 
found under the backseat where a passenger had been sitting, renders the remaining 
evidence sufficiently inconclusive as to whether defendant knew of the presence of the 
cocaine or had the intent to exercise dominion and control over the cocaine." Id. 
In Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, 1999 UT App 61, 975 P.2d 501, the Spanish Fork 
Police Department received information that drugs were being used at the defendant's 
and her husband's residence. Id. at If 2. Police officers searched the residence's garbage 
can and found residue containing methamphetamine, cocaine, and marijuana. Id. That 
It must be noted that the finding of any one of the evidentiary factors listed above is not determinative; that 
evidence must still be considered within the totality of the circumstances presented. State v. Layman, 953 P.2d at 
788-789 (Utah App. 1998). 
same day, the officers obtained a search warrant and searched the home finding "a roach 
clip, scissors, clippers, zig-zags (papers used to roll cigarettes), and 'antique' prescription 
pill bottles dated from 1968 to 1978." Id. Officers also found "hypodermic needles, 
hermostats, and a photograph of six men, including defendant's husband, in which two of 
the men were smoking a bong. The hypodermic needles were found beneath the mattress 
of the bed defendant shared with her husband." Id. All other items were found in plain 
view of the investigating officers. Id. The defendant was subsequently convicted for 
possession of drug paraphernalia. Id. at f^ 1. 
This Court in Bryan observed that the defendant was not present when the items 
were found; there was no evidence that the defendant used or intended to use the items 
for illegal purposes; there "was no evidence that [the defendant] participated in the 
mutual use of the items seized"; and the defendant made no incriminating statements. Id. 
at f 9. This Court stated, "Here, the necessary nexus between defendant and the items 
seized does not exist." Id. at % 10. This Court further stated that the conviction was based 
entirely upon inferences, and thus "the factual evidence in this case is inconclusive as to 
whether she possessed the items found in her home." Id. at f^ 11. This Court concluded 
that this "circumstantial evidence" was insufficient to prove constructive possession. Id. 
at ffi['s 10-11. 
In the present case, there was insufficient evidence to establish a sufficient nexus 
between Ferry and the drugs or paraphernalia to permit a factual inference that the he had 
the power and the intent to exercise control over those drugs or paraphernalia. Only two 
witnesses testified at trial, Deputy Kent Cameron and Ferry. The following is a 
summation of the marshaled evidence which would support the jury verdict. Cameron 
testified that when he pulled the vehicle over, he saw the driver, Corey Park, moving 
around and bending down to the floor (R. 197: 15, 16, 29). Ferry, who was sitting in the 
back seat directly behind the driver, made no furtive movements of any kind (R. 197: 29). 
After the passengers stepped out of the vehicle, Cameron saw a syringe lying on the floor 
where Ferry was sitting (R. 179: 19). Ferry told Cameron that he knew the syringe was 
there, but it was not his (R. 179: 20). Ferry was arrested and Cameron transported him to 
jail (R. 179: 27). While en route to jail, Cameron asked Ferry a few questions without 
advising him of his Miranda rights (R. 197: 27). Through this interrogation, Cameron 
learned that Ferry had "been addicted to drugs and had a drug problem with drugs for the 
past few years. His drug of choice was meth and he - the last time he had a hit or a dose 
of meth was ten hours ago, prior to me making contact with him" (R. 197: 39). 
These statements from Deputy Cameron, including offering the syringe and the lab 
report into evidence, are the complete marshaled facts that could support the jury verdict. 
However, comparing the circumstantial evidence in this case with the similar factual 
scenarios in Layman, Salas, and Bryan, it is clear that the evidence was insufficient to 
support the jury verdict and it was plain error for the judge to submit the case to the jury. 
For example, in Layman, where the defendant was pulled over for a traffic violation and 
methamphetamine and syringes were found in a pouch on a passenger, the cops could 
visually tell that Layman was under the influence of drugs so they had him tested. 
Layman, 953 P.2d at 784. A drug test revealed that Layman had methamphetamine in his 
system, and he was still heavily under the influence of the drugs. Id. Despite the fact that 
he had recently used methamphetamine and was traveling with drugs in his car, this 
Court found an insufficient nexus to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Layman had 
the intent to exercise dominion and control over the drugs. Id. at 790. The Court 
specifically found that Layman made no furtive movements which would suggest he 
handed something to the passenger. Id. In fact, this Court stated that even if Layman 
knew about the drugs, the evidence was still insufficient to establish he had the intent to 
exercise dominion and control over them. Id. 
The present case has strikingly similar facts with Layman. Both Layman and 
Ferry were stopped in a vehicle, and neither was found to be in possession of drugs. 
Layman, 953 P.2d at 790; (R. 197: 15, 20). It appears that both Layman and Ferry knew 
about the drugs and both denied ownership of the drugs. Id. at 791; (R. 197: 20). Both 
Layman and Ferry made no furtive movements inside the car which would suggest there 
was no attempt to dispose of drugs on their person. Id. at 790; (R. 197: 16). However, 
Layman tested positive for drugs and was clearly under the influence of 
methamphetamine at the time of his arrest, whereas there was no indication that Ferry 
was under the influence of drugs. Id. at 789; (R. 197: 27, 33, 36). Moreover, the officers 
found fresh needle marks on Layman's arms, whereas no such marks were found on 
Ferry. Id. at 793; (R. 197: 27). Although Ferry allegedly told the deputy that he did use 
drugs, no drug tests were performed on Ferry or any of the passengers to determine who 
was the owner of the methamphetamine in question (R. 197: 33). 
This case also has similarities with Salas. Salas was not the sole occupant of the 
car, just like here where there were four people in the car. Salas, 820 P.2d at 1387; (R. 
197: 15). The only evidence connecting Salas to the drugs was an allegation by an 
informant and being in the car where drugs were found. Id. at 1386, 1389. Moreover, the 
officer observed someone other than Salas moving around in a furtive manner just before 
the traffic stop, suggesting this passenger was trying to hide the drugs. Id. at 1389. The 
same is true in this case. It was the driver that was moving around in a suggestive 
manner, not Ferry; therefore, this evidence suggests, just like in Salas, that it was the 
driver Park that was attempting to hide the methamphetamine and not Ferry (R. 197: 15). 
And in Bryan, where a large amount of drug paraphernalia was found in the 
defendant's home, there was insufficient evidence that Bryan used or intended to use the 
items and there is insufficient evidence that Ferry used or intended to use the syringe. 
Bryan, 1999 UT App 61 at ]f 9. Moreover, both Bryan and Ferry made no incriminating 
statements. Id; (R. 197: 20, 27, 39). And just like Bryan, Ferry's conviction was based 
entirely upon inferences since the evidence is inconclusive as to whether he exercised 
dominion and control over the syringe. Id. at f 11. 
The only evidence linking Ferry to the syringe is the fact that it was found in the 
floorboard where his feet were after he exited the car (R. 197: 18-19). There are 
numerous explanations for this, all of them more reasonable than the inference that the 
syringe was Ferry's. 
The most likely scenario is that the syringe belonged to Corey Park. When the 
vehicle was pulled over, Park was seen making furtive movements suggesting he was 
hiding something (R. 197: 15). In fact he was; a later search revealed a box containing 
marijuana under Park's seat (R. 197: 22-23). Park admitted the marijuana was his, and 
was charged with possession of both marijuana and methamphetamine (R. 197: 30). For 
some unexplained reason, Park's charges were dismissed, even though he admitted that 
the marijuana was his (R. 197: 24, 30).2 It is highly plausible that Park's charges were 
dismissed because his father is a detective with the Salt Lake City Police Department (R. 
197: 32). Thus, considering these facts, it is more likely that the syringe was Park's and 
Park put the syringe on the floorboard when he was pulled over. 
Another plausible scenario just as likely is that the syringe belonged to the other 
backseat passenger Sarah Bizwell (R. 197: 34). Deputy Cameron knew that Bizwell had 
a long history of drug abuse, but apparently little or no investigation was directed towards 
her (R. 197: 34). In fact, the State failed to show whether or not Cameron questioned 
Bizwell to determine if the syringe belonged to her. And despite Cameron's knowledge 
of Bizwell's prior drug history, she was not subjected to any drug tests to determine if she 
would test positive for methamphetamine (R. 197: 34). Thus, Bizwell was just as likely, 
if not more likely to be the owner of the syringe. 
Moreover, the State failed to show what steps Cameron took, if any, to rule out 
that the syringe belonged to the passenger in the front seat. It could have been very easy 
for that passenger, or any other passenger, to simply toss the syringe on the floor board. 
However, Cameron apparently failed to ask this passenger as well as Bizwell if the 
syringe was theirs, and if he did, the State failed to introduce that evidence. 
2
 The State objected to this evidence coming in on the grounds of relevance (R. 197: 30). The trial court abused its 
discretion in sustaining the objection since it is relevant to show motive (R. 197: 31). 
Additionally, simple blood tests were not performed on any of the passengers, 
especially Park and Ferry since the record is clear that at least these two were arrested (R. 
197: 30, 33). There was simply no showing made by the State that Ferry was under the 
influence of drugs when he was arrested. While Cameron did testify that Ferry allegedly 
said he used methamphetamine ten hours prior to the arrest, that statement is insufficient, 
considering all the evidence in this case, to provide the sufficient nexus to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Ferry had the power and intent to exercise dominion and control 
over the syringe. The evidence, therefore, was insufficient to support the jury's verdict. 
B. The Trial Court Committed Plain Error by Submitting the Case to the 
Jury 
As shown above, it is clear that the evidence was insufficient to support a finding 
that Ferry constructively possessed the syringe and methamphetamine in question. 
Because the evidence was obviously insufficient to support the jury verdict, the trial court 
committed plain error by submitting the case to the jury. While this issue was not 
preserved below, Ferry asserts that this issue must be addressed under the plain error 
doctrine to "avoid injustice." See Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at f 13 (quoting State v. Eldridge, 
773 P.2d 29, 35 n.8 (Utah App. 1989). 
The State's failure to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt was so obvious and 
fundamental that it was plain error to submit this case to the jury. See Holgate, 2000 UT 
74 at f^ 17. But for this error, Ferry would not have been convicted. 
C. Trial Counsel's Failure to Move for a Directed Verdict Constituted 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. 
Ferry's trial counsel's performance was deficient and fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness for failing to move for a directed verdict. Moreover, this 
deficient performance affected the outcome of the trial. 
The claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for "failing to make a motion for 
directed verdict succeeds only if the State's evidence was not sufficient to support a 
conviction." State v. Reyes, 2000 UT App 310 (memorandum decision); See also Tillman 
v. Cook, 855 P.2d 211, 222 (Utah 1993), cert denied, 510 U.S. 1050, 114 S.Ct. 706, 126 
L.Ed.2d 671 (1994) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim based on failure to move to 
dismiss where the evidence to convict was sufficient)). 
In order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, it is the defendant's burden 
to show "first, that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable 
manner, which performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional 
judgment, and second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." State v. 
Kelley, 2000 UT 41, <§ 25, 1 P.3d 546 (citation omitted). As stated above, the evidence 
was insufficient as a matter of law to submit this case to the jury. Accordingly, trial 
counsel's performance was deficient for failing to move for a directed verdict under the 
reasoning set forth Reyes, But for this failure, this case would not have been submitted to 
the jury and Ferry would not have been convicted of possession of a controlled substance 
and possession of drug paraphernalia. 
IL TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO TIMELY FILE A MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS STATEMENTS MADE TO DEPUTY CAMERON 
CONSTITUTED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, 
THEREBY VIOLATING HIS FIFTH AND SIXTH AMENDMENT 
RIGHTS 
Five days before trial, trial counsel filed a motion to suppress statements made by 
Ferry to the police while he was in custody traveling in a police car to the county jail (R. 
77-79), However, this motion was untimely so the trial court never considered it (R 197: 
3-6). Ferry asserts that the police interview with Deputy Cameron which took place in 
his patrol car en route to the county jail was a custodial interrogation and any statements 
made during or as a result of this interview violated his rights as defined in Miranda. 
Furthermore, Ferry received ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed 
to timely file the motion to suppress. 
As previously stated above, in order to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, 
it is the defendant's burden to show "first, that his counsel rendered a deficient 
performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance fell below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment, and second, that counsel's performance 
prejudiced the defendant," Kelley, 2000 UT 41 at ^ 25 (citation omitted). If a defendant's 
Miranda rights were actually violated and trial counsel failed to timely file a motion to 
suppress and trial counsel's tardiness in bringing the suppression motion was prejudicial 
to defendant, then trial counsel's assistance is considered ineffective as a matter of law. 
See State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 354 (Utah App.1993). 
A. Ferry's Fifth Amendment Rights Against Self-incrimination Were 
Violated 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that defendants 
shall not be "compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." To secure 
this fundamental right, the United States Supreme Court established procedural safe-
guards that must be followed during custodial interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Statements elicited by police 
during a custodial interrogation must be suppressed if a defendant has not been advised of 
his constitutional rights per Miranda. State v. Larocco, 19A P.2d 460, 472 (Utah 1990). 
'The United States Supreme Court has defined 'custodial interrogation' as 
'questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into 
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Snyder, 
860 P.2d at 355 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612). Additionally, "the 
proper inquiry as to whether a defendant is in custody for the purposes of Miranda is 
whether a reasonable person in defendant's position would believe his 'freedom of action 
is curtailed to a degree associated with a formal arrest.'" Snyder, 860 P.2d at 355 (quoting 
State v. Mirquet, 844 P.2d 995, 998 (Utah App. 1992)). The United States Supreme 
Court has held that "the safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as 
a suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to a 'degree associated with formal arrest.'" 
Berkemer v McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) 
(citation omitted). 
This Court and the Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly looked at four key factors 
in the determination of whether a defendant is in custody for Miranda purposes: 1. The 
site of the interrogation; 2. Whether the investigation focused on the accused; 3. 
Whether the objective indicia of arrest were present; 4. The length and form of the 
interrogation. Salt Lake City v. Carrier, 664 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Utah 1983). Ferry asserts 
that these factors applied to the facts of this case are dispositive. For one, the 
interrogation occurred in the patrol car en route to the county jail (R. 197: 27). Two, 
Ferry was almost immediately arrested, so the investigation clearly focused on him (R. 
197: 27). Three, the objective indicia of arrest were present since Ferry was formally 
arrested and taken to jail (R. 197: 27). While the record is unclear on the exact time of 
the interrogation, Deputy Cameron admitted to asking Ferry questions without reading 
him his Miranda rights (R. 197: 27). 
The factors listed in Carner may not be necessary to review considering the fact 
that Ferry was formally arrested. There can be no question to the fact that he was 
"formally arrested" and "in custody" for Miranda purposes. A short time after Deputy 
Cameron stopped the vehicle for driving with no headlights on, he arrested Ferry and 
presumably placed Ferry in handcuffs in his patrol car (R. 197: 27). Thus, at the point of 
the formal arrest and certainly at the point that Ferry was placed in the patrol car, Ferry 
was "in custody." 
Once in custody, Ferry was entitled to a Miranda warning before any interrogation 
by the police. "[Tjhe Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody 
is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to say, the 
term 'interrogation' under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any 
words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest 
and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response. The latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of 
the suspect, rather than the intent of the police." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 
300-01, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689-90, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). See also Layion City v. 
Aragon, 813 P.2d 1213, 1215 (Utah App. 1991). 
Deputy Cameron testified that after he arrested Ferry and placed him in his patrol 
car, he questioned him while en route to the county jail (R. 197: 27, 39-40). Despite the 
obvious fact that Ferry was in custody, in a patrol car, and not free to leave, Cameron 
acknowledged that he questioned Ferry without advising him of his rights per Miranda 
(R. 197: 27, 39). Cameron specifically asked Ferry while en route to jail what his drug of 
choice was and when was the last time he had used (R. 78). Cameron testified that in 
response to his questions, Ferry said his drug of choice was methamphetamine and the 
last time he used was 10 hours prior to the arrest (R. 197: 27). 
Accordingly, the record clearly shows that Ferry was subjected to custodial 
interrogation in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. 
B. Trial Counsel's Failure to Timely File the Motion to Suppress 
Constituted Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Rule 12(c)(1)(B) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure requires defendants to 
file motions to suppress evidence "at least five days prior to the trial." Where trial 
counsel knew in advance of Miranda violations, but failed to file a motion to suppress 
within five days of trial with no legitimate trial tactic of doing so, trial counsel's actions 
fall "outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance." Snyder, 860 P.2d at 
359 (quoting State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986)); see also Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 669, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 
The record shows that Ferry's trial counsel knew well in advance of Deputy 
Cameron's failure to warn Ferry of his rights per Miranda while en route to jail. In fact, 
trial counsel explained to the trial court that the only reason why the motion was filed late 
was because she was under the mistaken impression that Ferry's trial would be continued, 
giving her more time to file the motion (R. 197: 5). Trial counsel also acknowledged that 
she was aware of the deadline, but due to her "busy schedule" she was unable to timely 
file it (R. 197: 5). The State agreed that trial counsel knew of the motion well in advance 
and had ample time to file it (R. 197: 4). 
Ferry asserts that there was no legitimate trial strategy in failing to timely file the 
motion to suppress. The fact that trial counsel filed the motion and requested the trial 
court to use its discretion and consider the motion despite its untimeliness attests that her 
belatedness was not trial strategy (R. 197: 3). Moreover, the substantial prejudicial affect 
the statements would have against Ferry also show that the late filing was not trial 
strategy. Accordingly, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to timely file the motion 
and Ferry was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. 
C. Trial Counsel's Objectively Deficient Performance Prejudiced Ferry 
"Prejudice will be held to exist only where the error undermines our confidence in 
the verdict against the defendant." Snyder, 860 P.2d at 359; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. 
at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. If a "reasonable probability exists that the jury's verdict would 
have been more favorable to defendant had the information from the interview been 
suppressed," then the verdict must be reversed. Id. 
As shown above in Point I, the evidence against Ferry was already thin and 
insufficient to support the verdict. The only evidence linking Ferry to the charges was 
the fact that the syringe was found near where he was sitting (R. 197: 19); Ferry's 
statement that he knew the syringe was there but it was not his (R. 197: 20); and Ferry's 
alleged admission that he used drugs and that he last used methamphetamine 10 hours 
prior to his arrest (R. 197: 27, 39). As shown in Point II, A, Ferry's alleged admission 
was taken without being given a Miranda warning (R. 197: 27). 
Had Ferry's alleged admission been suppressed, then the only evidence linking 
Ferry with the charges was his sitting nearby where drugs were found and his 
acknowledgment that he knew the drugs were there. There was no other evidence even 
suggesting that Ferry intended to use or possess the drugs. 
This Court has previously decided that where a defendant merely knows of the 
existence of items and the potential for illegal use, but there is no evidence of intent to 
make use of the knowledge and ability, the necessary nexus between defendant and the 
illegal items does not exist. Bryan, 1999 UT App 61 at fflf's 7, 10. Such is this case. 
There is simply no nexus between defendant and the illegal items without the alleged 
statements taken in violation of Miranda. Accordingly, Ferry's convictions must be 
reversed. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Ferry asks that this Court reverse his convictions of 
possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia due to 
insufficient evidence. In the alternative, Ferry asks that his convictions be reversed and 
the matter be remanded to the Third District Court with instructions that his statements 
taken in violation of Miranda be suppressed. 
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ADDENDA 
453 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 12 
Use of plea bargain or grant of immunity as Guilty plea as affected by fact that sentence 
improper vouching for credibility of witness — contemplated by plea bargain is subsequently 
state cases, 58 A.L.R.4th 1229. determined to be illegal or unauthorized, 87 
Ineffective assistance of counsel: misrepre- A.L.R.4th 384. 
sentation, or failure to advise, of immigration 
consequences of guilty plea — state cases, 65 
A.L.R.4th 719. 
Rule 12. Motions. 
(a) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall be by motion, 
which, unless made during a trial or hearing, shall be in writing and in 
accordance with this rule. A motion shall state succinctly and with particular-
ity the grounds upon which it is made and the relief sought. A motion need not 
be accompanied by a memorandum unless required by the court. 
(b) Request to Submit for Decision. When the time for filing a response to a 
motion and the reply has passed, either party may file a request to submit the 
motion for decision. The request shall be a separate pleading captioned 
"Request to Submit for Decision." The Request to Submit for Decision shall 
state the date on which the motion was served, the date the opposing 
memorandum, if any, was served, the date the reply memorandum, if any, was 
served, and whether a hearing has been requested. The notification shall 
contain a certificate of mailing to all parties. If no party files a request, the 
motion will not be submitted for decision. 
(c) Time for filing specified motions. Any defense, objection or request, 
including request for rulings on the admissibility of evidence, which is capable 
of determination without the trial of the general issue may be raised prior to 
trial by written motion. 
(c)(1) The following shall be raised at least five days prior to the trial: 
(c)(1)(A) defenses and objections based on defects in the indictment or 
information other than that it fails to show jurisdiction in the court or to 
charge an offense, which objection shall be noticed by the court at any time 
during the pendency of the proceeding; 
(c)(1)(B) motions to suppress evidence; 
(c)(1)(C) requests for discovery where allowed; 
(c)(1)(D) requests for severance of charges or defendants; or 
(c)(1)(E) motions to dismiss on the ground of double jeopardy. 
(c)(2) Motions for a reduction of criminal offense at sentencing pursuant to 
Utah Code Section 76-3-402 shall be in writing and filed at least ten days prior 
to the date of sentencing unless the court sets the date for sentencing within 
ten days of the entry of conviction. 
(d) A motion made before trial shall be determined before trial unless the 
court for good cause orders that the ruling be deferred for later determination. 
Where factual issues are involved in determining a motion, the court shall 
state its findings on the record. 
(e) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to make 
requests which must be made prior to trial or at the time set by the court shall 
constitute waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may grant relief from 
such waiver. 
(f) Except in justices' courts, a verbatim record shall be made of all 
Proceedings at the hearing on motions, including such findings of fact and 
conclusions of law as are made orally. 
(g) If the court grants a motion based on a defect in the institution of the 
prosecution or in the indictment or information, it may also order that bail be 
|ontinued for a reasonable and specified time pending the filing of a new 
Indictment or information. Nothing in this rule shall be deemed to affect 
provisions of law relating to a statute of limitations. 
Amended effective April 1, 1998; November 1, 2003.) 
